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INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE: 
LESSONS FROM UNEA AND PERSPECTIVES  
ON THE POST-2015 ERA
Joseph Nyangon*
ABSTRACT
The inaugural meeting of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) held in June 2014 in Nairobi, was a culmination of more than 
four decades of environmental governance since the United Nations Envi-
ronment Programme (UNEP) was established in 1972 in Stockholm. The 
meeting addressed weighty and contentious issues including strengthening 
of UNEP’s role in promoting environmental governance and enhancing sci-
ence-policy interface. Yet despite the historical significance of the meeting 
following universalization of the governing body of UNEP and current de-
bates on the post-2015 development agenda, questions persist about the 
role of UNEP, its establishment, performance, and fragmentation of pro-
grammes and secretariats of the multilateral environmental agreements as-
sociated with it. 
This paper reviews the outcome of the inaugural UNEA session, while 
developing a political economy account of institutional arrangements of 
international environmental governance to clarify the potential for, and 
barriers to effective environmental reform. Multilaterally, international 
environmental governance continues to exhibit elements of complexity, 
fragmentation, lack of coordination as well as redundancy. In more critical 
terms, lack of policy integration between environmental regimes is a con-
cern of environmental governance that the new UNEA should address as a 
matter of priority. Furthermore, incoherent policy objectives in internation-
al environmental law often characterised as a governance patchwork have 
been criticized for their economic orthodoxies that only serve to marginalize 
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and delegitimize alternative modes of environmental governance. In this re-
gard, a core part of UNEA’s institutional legitimacy depends on its success 
in coevolving to keep up with environmental challenges as they themselves 
change, as well as enhancing consensus-based stakeholder engagement, per-
spectives, and participation on environmental governance. This will be its 
true litmus test on how it responds coherently and effectively to internation-
al environmental governance in a post-2015 development world.
Keywords: International environmental governance, institutional arrange-
ments, UNEA, political economy, fragmentation, SDGs, post-2015 goals
1. INTRODUCTION
Nearly a century ago, American industrialist Henry Ford observed that coming together is a beginning; keeping together is progress; working 
together is success.2 Hopefully this holds as well for the historic inaugural 
session of the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) of the Unit-
ed Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), held in June 2014. Meeting 
under the overarching theme of sustainable development goals and the post-
2015 development agenda, delegates took part in the five days of plenary 
sessions, committee meetings, informal consultations, side events, and sev-
eral working and contact groups to consider draft decisions. Nearly 1,200 
participants attended the sessions including environment ministers, heads of 
international and intergovernmental organizations, government representa-
tives, business leaders and civil society representatives. 
The high-level segment of the assembly-gathering themed ‘a life of dig-
nity for all’ attracted representatives of 170 UN member states, 80 environ-
ment ministers and international leaders including UN Secretary-General 
Ban Ki-moon, the President of the 68th United Nations General Assembly 
John Ashe, and Prince Albert II of Monaco. Delegates adopted decisions 
and resolutions on key environmental issues on, inter alia: strengthening of 
UNEP’s role in promoting air quality; prioritizing and mainstreaming chem-
icals and waste management in national development plans; implementing 
Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development; en-
hancing science-policy interface; illegal trade in wildlife; ecosystem-based 
2 Erika Andersen, 2013. 21 Quotes From Henry Ford On Business, Leadership And Life. 
Forbes. Available at <http://www.forbes.com/sites/erikaandersen/2013/05/31/21-quotes-
from-henry-ford-on-business-leadership-and-life/> accessed October 7, 2014.
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adaptation; and marine debris and microplastics. In addition to the minis-
terial discussions, the UNEA meeting convened two symposia on financing 
a green economy and the environmental rule of law to address key aspects 
of environmental sustainability. However, questions persist about what role 
UNEA should aspire to distinguish itself as a robust policymaking platform 
for reinforcing environmental action in a post-2015 development era.
This paper develops a critical political economy account of interna-
tional environmental governance with special reference to UNEA and the 
post-2015 development agenda, its evolution and constitution of related 
institutions in order to improve upon our understanding of the current in-
ternational reforms, and the bargains that underpin them. It also clarifies 
thinking about the potential for strengthening UNEP institutional arrange-
ments of environmental governance and analyzes reasons for fragmentation 
of global environmental governance architectures that goes beyond dyadic 
overlaps between individual regimes. It reflects on intergovernmental pro-
cesses addressing the development agenda for the post-2015 era, the histor-
ical, political and material elements of constitution and reforms of multi-
lateral environmental agreements (MEAs), as contained in The Future We 
Want,3 which defined a number of targeted action areas for the achievement 
of sustainable development as well as the promotion of a green economy.4
For the success of this account, however, it is also pertinent to under-
stand political and historical elements of evolution of UNEP’s governing 
body,5 its reconfiguration and universalization as UNEA. These are: 
What is international environmental governance?; how are the 
key contours, as well as the practice of environmental governance, 
which drive inquiry into international environmental governance issues 
addressed?; who governs, what is governed and how do they govern?; 
how are appropriate institutional arrangements for sustainable governance 
pertinent to the debates and governance on sustainable development goals 
(SDGs) in a post-2015 development world established?; and what are the 
viable funding mechanisms for obtaining the objectives defined therein? 
3 UN General Assembly, 2012. Resolution A/66/L.56: The Future We Want. July 27, 2012. 
The UN General Assembly in resolutions 66/288 and 67/213 endorsed the Rio+20 outcome 
document, The Future We Want.
4 Ibid [paras. 104–244].
5 UNEP Governing Council was established pursuant to article 22 of the United Nations 
Charter. At its first universal session in 2013 the Council adopted decision 27/2, in which it 
invited the UN General Assembly to adopt a resolution to rename the Governing Council 
as the United Nations Environment Assembly (UNEA) of the United Nations Environment 
Programme (UNEP).
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The first part of the paper reflects on the dominant themes of enforce-
ment of environmental treaties and that of strengthening institutional ar-
rangements of environmental governance. The second part articulates his-
torical account of the emergence of UNEA, paying particular attention to 
UNEP’s institutional form, catalytic functions, location and the changing 
demands in international environmental governance that require more so-
phisticated and critical approaches, visions, models and tools for environ-
mental sustainability. The third part elucidates the decision and resolutions 
adopted at the first session of UNEA. The fourth part reflects on the insights 
and critical political economy account of the nature and development of 
UNEA, providing examples of insights into continued efforts to strengthen 
UNEP to support implementation of the post-2015 development agenda 
and coordination of multilateral environmental agreements practice that 
help to address the questions outlined above. Finally, the paper concludes 
with reflections on the benefits that might be derived from strengthening 
institutional arrangements of global environmental architecture. 
2. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL GOVER-
NANCE: INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVES
The idea of improving enforcement of, and strengthening institutional arrangements of environmental treaties are two dominant themes in 
international environmental governance.6 For this reason, it is important to 
trace how these two issues were handled between the 1972 Stockholm and 
2012 Rio conferences, and later at the first session of UNEA in June 2014, 
in order to highlight salient historical events and facts that explain how the 
international community has responded to the problems of environment. 
But before then we need to understand the meaning of international envi-
ronmental governance (IEG). The International Institute for Sustainable De-
velopment (IISD) defines global environmental governance as: “the sum of 
organizations, policy instruments, financing mechanisms, rules, procedures 
and norms that regulate global environmental protection.”7 According to 
the UN Joint Inspection Unit, the international environmental governance 
6 Peter Newell, 2008. “The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance,” Re-
view of International Studies, ISBN 507529 (2008): p. 510; and Maria Carmen Lemos and 
Arun Agrawal, 2006. “Environmental Governance” Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources 31: 297-325: p. 310.
7 Adil Najam, Mihaela Papa, Nadaa Taiyab, 2006. Global Environmental Governance: 
A Reform Agenda. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). ISBN 
1-895536-91-x (2006): p. 9. 
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consists of four major pillars, inter alia: coherent decision-making and ob-
jective-setting for international environmental policies among different en-
vironmental agreements and institutions; management and operationaliza-
tion of the policies and decisions; institutional architecture to implement 
and coordinate environmental policies and decisions; and coordination of 
the effective implementation of IEG decisions at the country level.8
These definitions are remarkably consonant with the definition of glob-
al environmental governance discussed by Beyerlin et al., as a “multi-actor 
governance system which extends beyond traditional actors (such as states 
and international organisations) and includes non-governmental organisa-
tions, in particular, activist groups, networks of scientists, business asso-
ciations and policy research institutions.”9 Above all, IEG is increasingly 
building new forms of cooperation beyond the traditional intergovernmen-
tal negotiation that, at least formally, is still the primary actor to include 
non-state actors who are becoming part of non-hierarchical, norm-making, 
norm-setting and norm-implementing institutions of environmental sustain-
ability, and its operationalization. For example, since 2008, there has been 
remarkable evolution in strengthening environmental governance.10 With 
respect to differentiation, segmentation and fragmentation, institutional ar-
rangements is thus a vital component of a holistic international environmen-
tal framework as it has the ability to influence coordination, system-wide 
coherence and mainstreaming of the environmental dimension at the phase 
of sustainable development.11
8 Tadanori Inomata and Jean Wesley Cazeau, 2008. UN Joint Inspection Unit. Post-Rio+20 
Review of Environmental Governance within the United Nations System, UN Doc. JIU/
REP/2014/4 (2014): p. 2; Also See generally UNEP/IGM/2/INF/3 for details on the defi-
nition of international environmental governance agreed at the Consultative Meeting of 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) on IEG on April 12, 2001.
9 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, 2011. “International Environmental Law.” Devon: 
Hart Publishing, p. 244.
10 Tadanori Inomata and Jean Wesley Cazeau, 2008. UN Joint Inspection Unit. Post-Rio+20 
Review of Environmental Governance within the United Nations System. [p. 6].
11 Initiatives undertaken at the international level on environmental governance to date have 
had limited success in improving system-wide coherence, reducing costs and improving ef-
ficiency. In June 2014, the Committee for Development Policy—an expert body of the UN 
Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)—wrote a policy note titled, Global Governance 
and Global Rules for Development in the Post-2015 Era, in which they argued that global 
environmental governance currently exists as “a fragmented set of poorly supported rules 
and a group of international institutions with partial competencies, overlapping one another 
with informal mechanisms for dialogue and multiple and varied agreements at a bilateral and 
regional level” p. 42; Also see Alexander Betts, ed., 2011. Global Migration Governance. 
Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press; and Bimal Ghosh, ed., 2000. Managing 
Migration: Time for a New International Regime? Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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The Rio+20 meeting marked an inflection point in IEG as world’s gov-
ernments recognized that the international institutional framework for sus-
tainable development should be consistent with the Rio Principles, build 
on Agenda 21 and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation. Rio+20 was 
preceded by a long line of mega conferences.12 Although based on analysis 
of both proximate political factors and deeper social and historical determi-
nants of state action, the outcomes of those mega-summits remain mixed,13 
the preparatory processes especially of UNCED, Rio+20 and indeed UNEA 
have benefited from the lessons learned from the pioneering work of UNEP. 
Further, these intergovernmental tracks and processes constitute a signifi-
cant background to the (re) constitution, evolution and development of in-
ternational environmental law in the last four decades, as well as the steady 
spread of global norm of environmentalism in the global North and South.14 
Since its establishment in Stockholm four decades ago, UNEP has carried 
out a number of successful activities to discharge its catalytic and coordinat-
ing role in the field of environment within the United Nations system, albeit 
under a limited institutional mandate.15 Its focus has steadily grown from 
addressing first generation environmental problems namely, air and water 
pollution, and soil (land degradation) to second generation environmental 
12 Rio+20 was preceded by the 1972 Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, 
the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED or the Rio Earth 
Summit); and the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD). Four famous 
cornerstones of international environmental law and first institutional framework emerged 
from Stockholm, including the Stockholm Declaration; the Action Plan for the Human En-
vironment; the creation of UNEP; and the voluntary Environment Fund. The international 
community has followed the multilateral, mega-summit approach with the subsequent con-
ferences in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 and Johannesburg in 2002. 
13 Lucy H. Ford, 2003. “Challenging Global Environmental Governance: Social Movement 
Agency and Global Civil Society.” Global Environmental Politics 3(2): p. 122.
14 Peter Newell, 2008. The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance, Re-
view of International Studies, [p. 517], laments the continued reduction of environmental 
governance especially within the International Relations (IR) purview to the study of in-
ternational environmental law and the institutions that produce it and enforce it, in spite 
of the growing attention to the means in which inter-state bargains can be aided by non-
state actors. Furthermore, as global environmental ‘culture’ spreads it gradually envelopes 
more states in a world institutional structure, creating a social system that subsumes the 
traditional international political world. Also See, Meyer, J.W., D.J. Frank, A. Hironaka, 
E. Schofer and N. Brandon Tuma (1997.) The Structuring of a World Environmental Re-
gime, 1870–1990, International Organization 51(4): p. 623–9, for detailed evaluation of 
the global norm of environmentalism.
15 Maria Ivanova, 2010. “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, 
Location.” Global Environmental Politics, 8(1) (2010):  p. 42.
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problems,16 such as acid rain, stratospheric ozone layer depletion, climate 
change, deforestation and desertification, biodiversity loss, and chemicals 
and wastes management. It is against this background that the next section 
sets out to analyze the historical account and determinants of the emergence 
of UNEP and explore some of the key procedural challenges.
3. A VIEW FROM THE CONFERENCE: OUTCOMES  
OF THE FIRST UNEA SESSION
Questions persist about the role of UNEP, its establishment, location, performance, and the conventions and secretariats of the MEAs asso-
ciated with it.17,18 It may, therefore, be useful to revisit some of the salient 
historical events that led to the establishment of UNEP in Stockholm in 
1972. UNEP has come a long way since the times when environmental agen-
da was frequently regarded as the “preoccupation of the few at the expense 
of the many or “the luxury of the rich at the expense of the poor.”19 The first 
session of UNEA therefore marked a coming of age of global environmental 
governance, as for the first time, all 193 UN member states were represented 
along with their multi-stakeholder partners—the most significant transfor-
mation and reconfiguration to international environmental governance since 
UNEP’s creation. As noted above, at its first universal session the UNEP’s 
governing body adopted decision 27/2, and decided UNEA would set global 
environmental agenda, provide overarching policy guidance on emerging 
environmental challenges, as well as foster partnerships for achieving envi-
ronmental goals and resource mobilization.20
16 Gabriela Kütting, 2003. “Globalization, Poverty and the Environment in West Africa: Too 
Poor to Pollute?” Global Environmental Politics. 3(4): 42-60: p. 49.
17 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, 2011. “International Environmental Law.” Devon [p. 
250].
18 Maria Ivanova, 2010. “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, 
Location.” Global Environmental Politics [p. 31-33].
19 At Stockholm, debates on UNEP’s functions and institutional arrangements remained con-
tentious due to governments simply adamant to surrender legislative and enforcement pow-
ers on environmental decision-making to a supranational body. Thus UNEP emerged from 
Stockholm as a coordinating body with a limited mandate and without operational func-
tions, but with the possibility of evolving and (re) constituting its coordinating and catalytic 
role and functions based on the changing circumstances for environmental action within 
the UN system. Forty years later at Rio+20, debate over coordination and strengthening 
international environmental governance through a specialized agency status for UNEP 
continued. For this, delegates made a few institutional rearrangements, e.g. establishment 
of UNEA as a visible sign of the enhanced status of UNEP to allow it to contribute ef-
fectively to global solutions, provide effective leadership on international environmental 
governance, and boost UNEP’s legitimacy; UNEP; Our Planet: The magazine of the United 
Nations Environment Programme. ISSN: 1013–7394 (2014).
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An area of intense debate since the Stockholm Conference has been the 
institutionalization of a single-window, coordinated funding mechanism for 
action plans and outcome policy documents.21 It is vital to note, however, 
that at Stockholm the question of incremental costs for integrating envi-
ronmental dimension into development programmes, in the implementation 
of Stockholm’s Action Plan, was a key focus and concern of developing 
countries22 just like new and innovative funding mechanisms became their 
concern with respect to the implementation of Agenda 21, for which Global 
Environment Facility (GEF) was established.23 
A. Unplugging UNEA: Mobilizing Private Capital to Finance Green 
Economy
At the UNEA Conference, focus seemed to have shifted from the cre-
ation of UN Environment Organization (UNEO) or World Environment Or-
ganization to financing the green economy through mobilization of private 
capital alongside public finance. In this regard, there was wide support for 
long-term financing strategy focused on investment in resource efficiency, 
environment in markets, use of regulatory incentives prudently, as well as 
elimination of negative price distortions. Mobilization of private capital was 
backed by several international organizations at the first UNEA session, in-
cluding the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD).24 In its 
2014 World Investment Report, UNCTAD points to a discernible “invest-
ment gap” between available project finance and what is required for scaling 
20 Paragraphs 14 and 15 of decision 27/2 stressed the importance of regional ministerial envi-
ronment forums for which UNEP serves as the secretariat, and invited them to contribute to 
the work of UNEP’s governing body, as well as called on UNEP to assist countries in imple-
menting national environmental programmes, policies and plans. However, strong regional 
presence for UNEP as well as support for countries in implementing national programmes 
require linking up with UN regional commissions, funds, programmes, as well as with 
MEAs such as the Basel Convention, the Montreal Protocol, the Stockholm Convention, 
and the Convention on Biological Diversity to promote compliance, coherence and syner-
gies; UNEP Governing Council decision 27/2 (2013). For detailed evaluation, See UNEP/
GC.27/17. 
21 GEF is one example of experiment in coordinated funding. See Adil Najam, Mihaela Papa, 
Nadaa Taiyab, 2006. Global Environmental Governance: A Reform Agenda. p. 56.
22 Frank Biermann, 2012. “Greening the United Nations Charter: World politics in the An-
thropocene.” Environment, p. 8.
23 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, 2011. “International Environmental Law.” Devon [p. 
252]. 
24 UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2014. Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan. United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, United Nations, New York and Geneva 
(2014). The report reveals global foreign direct investment (FDI) flows rose by 9 per cent in 
2013 to $1.45 trillion after a decline in 2012, with this growth expected to continue in the 
coming years. The FDI growth shows potential of international investment to help reach 
post-2015 development agenda.
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up green economy investments as one of five potential options for strength-
ening investments in the sustainable development goals (SDGs), shown in 
Table 1, and achieving effective international environmental governance 
(the others being increasing absorptive capacity; establishing effective regu-
latory frameworks and standards; good governance, strengthening institu-
tional arrangements, and implementing SDG impact assessment systems). A 
more recent High Level Dialogue on Public Support for Renewable Energy, 
hosted by the International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) in January 
2014 in Abu Dhabi, concluded there is a “missing compelling narrative” for 
mobilizing private capital alongside public finance in the renewable energy 
sector, requiring an authoritative voice to articulate the existing business 
case to promote policy change, as well as boosting project and development 
investment.25 At the UNEA meeting, this mobilization of private capital in-
cluding capital markets was supported by developing countries as well as a 
number international financial institutions and banks. China stressed green 
economic growth and the pollution emission rules as its strategic choice for 
development, emphasizing investments in green practices and achievements, 
including through green crediting. Many developing countries emphasized 
unlocking private finance through committed green economic policies and 
a risk management framework for assessing and managing environmental 
and social risk in projects. However, participants also lamented the broken 
definition of corporate values that only consider short-term returns with-
out appreciating sustainability. They called for solutions that emphasize 
working with governments to write bankable projects, low-risk policies 
and blended finance to overcome the savings-investment gap especially in 
health, transport and energy sectors which require high capital investment. 
These countries argued that this question requires further deliberation and 
analysis to create a common understanding, find global solutions and move 
toward green growth.
25 See International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA). Renewable Energy and Jobs: Annual 
Review 2014 (2014).
26 UN Open Working Group on Sustainable Development Goals (OWG), “Working Docu-
ment for 5-9 May Session of Open Working Group,” (2012) available at: http://sustain-
abledevelopment.un.org, accessed 07.19.14.
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B. Institutional Coordination
At the UNEA summit, while a number of documents were introduced noting the progress in consolidation of UNEP headquarters functions 
in Nairobi, there was no substantive conclusion on how consolidation of 
functions strengthen UNEP and delegates resolved that it should be imple-
mented “progressively in line with the decision of the Governing Council”.27 
Furthermore, some developed countries led by the United States and Swit-
zerland argued that long-term cost implications of the consolidation, the 
definition of ‘headquarters functions’ and how the consolidation objective 
will improve efficiency needed broader analysis and justification.28 
27 See Report of the Executive Director, UNEP/EA.1/2/Add.5 on implementation of Govern-
ing Council Decision 27/2 on consolidation of headquarters functions. See UNEP/EA.1/
INF/16 for supplemental information on the consolidation.
28 Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB). Report of the First Meeting of the Open-ended Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives (OECPR) to UNEP. Available at: <www.iisd.ca> (last 
access 15 July 2014).
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2014), Table IV.1. UN Open Working Group on Sustainable 
Development Goals, working document, 5-9 May 2014 session. 
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Table 1. Overview of prospective SDG focus areas
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According to a recent analysis by the UN Joint Inspection Unit, “head-
quarters functions of UNEP” refers to the “support and backstop functions 
provided for regional and/or national activities undertaken by UNEP offices 
or officials in the field, as well as the governing body’s high-level ministerial 
oversight and synthesis of its decentralized capacities throughout the world 
for the smooth implementation of its decisions.29 In this regard, the consoli-
dation might extend to the secretariats of MEAs participating in the work of 
UN country teams. Yet, intergovernmental processes determine the location 
of MEA secretariats and the organization cannot unilaterally relocate those 
staff members. Amendment to the GEF instrument was also introduced and 
supported by the United States to, inter alia: amend paragraph 2 of the 
instrument, inviting GEF to revise its focal area structure and strategy to 
address the chemicals and waste management; and permit GEF to serve as 
one of the financial mechanisms of the Minamata Convention.30 UNEP also 
received UNDP’s support by joining the UNEP-led Partnership for Action 
for a Green Economy. Progress at the first UNEA meeting, in sum, has been 
modest. And yet, the reconstituted governing body of UNEP and Global 
Ministerial Environment Forum, with universal membership, reveals an or-
ganization that has finally come of age and self-confident about its legiti-
macy to drive a transformation of IEG, despite operational and functional 
challenges, making transformation to implementing agency status, like oth-
er UN agencies such as the UNDP, in the years to come more likely.
A second main reform issue regarding the institutional framework for 
sustainable development is the symbiotic relationship between international 
and national environmental law, as well as the strengthening of environ-
mental rule of law to ensure just and sustainable development outcomes. 
In particular, the contribution of environmental law to sustainable develop-
ment and a green economy including attainment of social equity, justice and 
sustainable governance was a strong theme at the first session of UNEA. To 
further the integration of UNEP’s work on environmental rule of law and 
lay a strong foundation for environmental democracy and sustainable gov-
ernance, participants held interactive debates and dialogues on, inter alia: 
boosting environmental impact assessments, incorporating environmental 
rights in national constitutions, universalization of the rights of nature, bal-
ancing environmental concerns against property rights, dissemination of 
29 Tadanori Inomata and Jean Wesley Cazeau, 2008. Post-Rio+20 Review of Environmental 
Governance within the United Nations System [p. 44-45].
30 See UNEP/EA.1 L.4 on the amendment of the instrument for the establishment of the re-
structured GEF.
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information on environmental rights to build capacity of judicial officers 
to respond effectively to environmental related crimes, and the feasibility of 
establishing an international environmental court or expanding mandates of 
existing courts to deal with rising environmental related crime such as illegal 
wildlife trade, among others.31 
C. Defining Sustainable Development Goals and Post-2015 Devel-
opment Agenda
A third major outcome of UNEA was the adoption of draft proceedings at its first universal session and reaffirmation of its commitment to full 
implementation of the Rio+20 outcome document and all the principles of 
the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development.32,33 Delegates also 
agreed to, inter alia: accelerate and support efforts for the promotion of 
sustainable consumption and production patterns, including through sus-
tainable lifestyles and resource efficiency; ensure full integration of the en-
vironmental dimension, especially throughout the sustainable development 
agenda; achieve an ambitious, universal, implementable and realizable post-
2015 development agenda that fully integrates the economic, social and en-
vironmental dimensions of sustainable development in a coherent, holistic, 
comprehensive and balanced way; and take action to prevent, combat and 
eradicate the illegal trade in wildlife and wildlife products.34 They also re-
solved to undertake urgent actions to address climate change to achieve 
sustainable development by working towards the adoption of an ambitious 
outcome in the form of a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed 
outcome with legal force under the UNFCCC applicable to all parties in 
2015, in accordance with the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action; en-
sure the full implementation of MEAs and other international and regional 
environmental commitments in an effective and coordinated manner while 
promoting synergies among them, acknowledging their positive contribu-
tion to sustainable development; reinforce efforts to halt biodiversity loss 
and combat desertification, drought and land degradation; and foster and 
encourage the development of genuine and durable partnerships to address 
31 See UNEP/EA.1/L.2 and Add.1.
32 UNEA Ministerial Outcome Document of the First Session of the United Nations Environ-
ment Assembly (UNEA) of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 2014, 
available at <http://www.unep.org/unea/docs/UNEA-1%20outcome%20document.pdf>, 
Accessed October, 7, 2014.
33 See UNEP/EA.1/L.1 and Add.1-2 presented and adopted at the first session of UNEA. Del-
egates also adopted UNEP/EA.1/L.2 and Add.1.
34 Ibid [20-21].
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environmental challenges faced by small island developing States.
In Nairobi, governments also resolved to, inter alia: strengthen the role 
of the UNEP in promoting air quality; enhance science-policy interface; im-
prove knowledge on measures and techniques to reduce microplastics in 
the marine environment; finalize the report on the relationship between 
UNEP and MEAs and present it to the next Open-Ended Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (OECPR); provide and enhance support to de-
veloping countries on ecosystem-based adaptation; encourage countries to 
strengthen international dialogue, cooperation, technical assistance and 
capacity building in support of the implementation of Principle 10 of the 
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development35; different visions, ap-
proaches, models and tools to achieve environmental sustainability in the 
context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; coordination 
across the UN system in the field of the environment, including the Envi-
ronment Management Group; illegal trade in wildlife; and chemicals and 
wastes. They acknowledged the historic importance of the first universal 
UNEA session and recognized “the fundamental role of the Environment 
Assembly [UNEA] in promoting the full integration and coherent imple-
mentation of the environmental dimension of sustainable development and 
its potential to identify opportunities and advance solutions for the global 
environmental agenda.”36 Governments also reaffirmed their commitment 
to the full implementation of the Rio+20 outcome document, The Future 
We Want, including the implementation of the environmental pillar in the 
context of sustainable development, and paragraph 88, on strengthening 
and upgrading UNEP.
Unlike the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which were tar-
geted at developing countries, the new Sustainable Development Goals will 
also cover industrialized countries and potentially define UN-agreed ‘de-
velopment goals’ also for the North, a subject that the United States tried 
hard to prevent at the Rio+20, yet in vain. Briefing a high-level ministerial 
segment at the UNEA on the progress in the Open Working Group (OWG) 
negotiations, Co-Chair of the OWG on SDGs, Ambassador Macharia Ka-
mau, explained the 17 draft SDGs and the unprecedented scale of the UN 
consultative process. Delegates urged UNEP to ensure full integration of 
sustainability across all the SDGs, stressing that the organization could offer 
practical tools for integrating sustainability across the social and econom-
35 UNEA Ministerial Outcome Document, 2014. See also final resolution UNEP/EA.1/L.13.
36 Ibid [20].
Nyangon: International Environmental Governance and the UNEA         187
ic SDGs. Furthermore, ministers of environment and heads of delegation 
also called on the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)and the UN 
General Assembly to “give appropriate consideration” to the outcome doc-
ument “with a view to the balanced integration of the three dimensions of 
sustainable development in the work of the UN and its Member States”.37 
However, it remains to be seen if these bodies will take stock of environ-
mental stakeholders’ views ahead of the second meeting of the High-level 
Political Forum on Sustainable Development and the final meeting of the 
OWG in New York, as the concrete topics covered by the UNEA outcome 
document such as illegal trade in wildlife and relationship between UNEP 
and MEAs—sensitive issues for both the North and South—were not con-
clusively addressed.
During UNEA’s Committee of the Whole, Kenya introduced a resolu-
tion on illegal trade in wildlife to mobilize political will, leadership and 
resources, in response to the Rio+20 Conference for a “firm and strength-
ened” action on this matter.38 However, while noting UNEP’s engagement 
on the issue, the United States supported by Switzerland, Iran and China 
stressed that UNEP should work “within its mandate” to avoid duplication 
of efforts. Despite its high profile at the first session of UNEA, delegates 
seemed less convinced that UNEP is the right institution to address the mat-
ter noting that many member states have dedicated ministries of wildlife and 
tourism and the matter has already been taken up in a number of interna-
tional fora. Furthermore, some delegates observed that to ensure sufficient 
mobilization and enforcement at the highest levels, the issue requires coor-
dination by ministries of internal security or even the office of the president 
and not just ministries of environment, due to its close links to corruption 
networks, organized crime and insecurity.39 Governments, therefore, called 
upon the UN General Assembly to consider the issue of illegal wildlife trade 
at its 69th session, and stressed the importance of addressing the issue in the 
context of the post-2015 development framework. It is therefore likely that 
the issue will feature again at the second UNEA session in May 2016.
A second important discussion agenda for both the North and South is the 
relationship between UNEP and MEAs, including strengthening the coordina-
tion role of UNEP across the UN System in the field of environment including 
37 Ibid [21].
38 See draft decision, UNEP/ EA.1/CW/CRP.5.
39 Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB). Report of the First UN Environment Assembly of the 
United Nations Environment Programme, 2014, available at <www.iisd.ca>, accessed Oc-
tober 7, 2014.
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the Environment Management Group (EMG). Coordination was identified 
in Agenda 21 as central issue of international environmental governance 
due to the increasing number of international legal agreements. This was 
reaffirmed at the Rio+20 summit, which established ‘a universal intergov-
ernmental high level political forum, building on the strengths, experiences, 
resources and inclusive participation modalities of the Commission on Sus-
tainable Development, and subsequently replacing the Commission,”40 and 
reaffirmed in GC decision 27/5, calling for UNEP to coordinate system-wide 
strategies on the environment. At Rio+20, ECOSOC, a high-level political 
forum on sustainable development, was also mandated to provide leader-
ship in sustainable development issues and enhance the three dimensions of 
sustainable development in a holistic manner through a “dynamic platform 
for regular dialogue, and stocktaking and agenda setting to advance sus-
tainable development”.41 However, in the final outcome document at the 
historic first UNEA session, evidence of a strengthened coordination role 
of UNEP, in sum, was negligible. Governments mostly resolved to iden-
tify possible measures to maximize the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
EMG and to submit a report with recommendations to the second session of 
UNEA. Delegates further resolved to submit a report to the second session 
of UNEA, with proposals developed in conjunction with the EMG describ-
ing the integration of the outcome of the post-2015 development agenda 
into the environmental work of the UN. While there was much discussion 
at the UNEA session on the relationship between UNEP and MEAs, work 
remained unfinished as the report on the issue to be presented to the OECPR 
for consideration, has not progressed beyond the information document.42 
In addition, although many delegates urged UNEP to avoid duplicating 
work, it seems the trend towards UNEP stepping up its work with MEAs is 
gaining momentum.
D. Minding the Gaps in Science and Policy Interface
The UNEA conference brought to light a prevailing disconnect between science and policy. Like the Rio+20 Conference that preceded it a cou-
ple of years ago, at which the scientific community invested substantial re-
sources long before the conference started in publishing books, research 
40 According to The Future We Want, 2012, para. 83, ECOSOC shall be strengthened to 
foster a “key role in achieving a balanced integration of the three dimensions of sustainable 
development.”
41 Ibid [para. 85.k].
42 UNEP/EA.1/INF/8 draft decision on relationship between UNEP and MEAs.
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papers, articles, as well as adopting The State of the Planet Declaration, the 
inaugural UNEA session was preceded by the release of numerous scientif-
ic publications. Addressing the closing plenary, UN Secretary-General Ban 
Ki-moon underscored this fact, noting UNEP’s role in scientific research, 
governance and providing tools to help mainstream environment into pol-
icymaking processes. Delegates also underscored UNEP’s flagship assess-
ments, such as the Global Environmental Outlook, the Global Environment 
Monitoring System (GEMS)/Water Programme, which help to bridge the 
science-policy-practice gap.
Yet, this growing acceptance of the science-policy interface is rarely re-
flected in governmental discussions. Because of the proliferation of MEAs 
and fragmentation of IEG as well as lack of cooperation and coordination 
among international organizations of coordination, non-state actors in a 
state-centric system, and inefficient use of resources, some experts have ar-
gued the role of science in environmental governance is on the decline, while 
the rapid evolution of IEG has led the system to outgrow itself creating new 
institutional challenges.43 At the nation-state level, environmental politics 
often follow disaster, for example in international marine environmental 
law that advances with a new treaty or regulatory policy after each major 
marine disaster such as oil leaks. From the perspective of many scientists, 
the impact of microplastics in the marine environment is now approach-
ing a global disaster. Yet, adequate political responses are lacking. It would 
be simplistic to explain this lack of political action purely by inadequacies 
in defining and framing the problem. Still, the global awareness of related 
threats to human health and the environment and global cooperation needs 
to be improved. At the UNEA session, the United States, Australia, Chile, 
Switzerland and the EU supported proposal by Norway to strengthen coop-
eration under the Global Partnership on Marine Litter and to undertake a 
study to strengthen knowledge on measures and techniques to reduce micro-
43 Adil Najam, Mihaela Papa, Nadaa Taiyab, 2006. Global Environmental Governance: A 
Reform Agenda. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) [p. 14]. See 
generally: Maria Ivanova, 2005. Can the Anchor Hold? Rethinking the United Nations En-
vironment Programme for the 21st Century. New Haven: Yale School of Forestry and En-
vironmental Studies. Accessed at <http://www.yale.edu/gegdialogue> in July 2014; Norichi-
ka Kanie and Peter M. Haas (eds), Emerging Forces in Environmental Governance (Hong 
Kong: United Nations University Press, 2004); John Vogler, ‘In Defense of International 
Environmental Cooperation’, in John Barry and Robyn Eckersley (eds), The State and the 
Global Ecological Crisis (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), pp. 229–55; and Knigge, M., 
Herweg, J. and Huberman, D., 2005. Geographical Aspects of International Environmen-
tal Governance: Illustrating Decentralisation. Berlin: Ecologic Institute for International 
and European Environmental Policy. Available at: <http://www.ecologic.de/ download/ver-
schiedenes/2005/knigge_fragmentation.pdf> in July 2014.
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plastics in the marine environment.44 However, the United States proposed 
a broad framing of the issue as a marine debris problem to include marine 
plastics and microplastics. In the final outcome document, governments ad-
opted resolution on marine plastic debris and microplastics stressing the im-
portance of precautionary approach; recognizing the significant risks arising 
from inadequate management and disposal of plastic; and emphasizing the 
need for more knowledge and research on the source and fate of microplas-
tics and their impact on biodiversity, marine ecosystems and human health. 
However, the business and industry expressed concern about singling out 
plastics over other forms of marine debris. Without better integration of 
these multiple challenges and actors, organizational rearrangement alone 
cannot resolve institutional problems. The overall integration of existing 
knowledge on the environmental security of the planet on a stable basis and 
with a high authority in the UN system is clearly missing.
Crucial processes in environmental action such as science-policy in-
terface and strengthened stakeholder engagement are vital components of 
sustainable governance. The Committee of the Whole observed that UNEA 
should recognize gaps in knowledge on the state of the environment and 
UNEP should present a gap analysis report on environmental data as well 
as recommendations on policy instruments for a strengthened science-policy 
interface. Furthermore, delegates resolved that UNEP should provide expert 
input on the environment in relation to the SDGs; and work with other UN 
bodies, including UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, in pro-
ducing the global sustainable development report. In preparations for the 
UNEA summit, the first ever UNEP Open-ended Committee of Permanents 
Representatives was held in March 2014, at which UNEP presented ongo-
ing scientific work as well as proposed actions to strengthen the science-pol-
icy interface.45 In Rio+20, governments agreed that strengthening of UNEP 
implies adequate and increased financial resources to enhance science-poli-
cy-interface and UNEP’s catalytic and coordination role, as well as enhanc-
ing stakeholder engagement. This was evident at the UNEA session with 
delegates deciding to promote a strong science-policy interface building on 
existing international instruments, assessments, panels and information net-
works, including the Global Environment Outlook (GEO), as one of the 
processes aimed at bringing together information and assessment to support 
44 See draft decision by Norway (UNEP/EA.1/L.1), on strengthening knowledge on measures 
and techniques to reduce microplastics in the marine environment.
45 UNEP/EA.1/3/Add.1. See also draft decisions on the state of the environment (UNEP/
EA.1/4) and UNEP Live platform (UNEP/EA.1/4/Add.1).
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informed decision-making. Other ongoing measures to improve informa-
tion access debated at UNEA included operationalizing inclusive knowledge 
management through the UNEP Live.46 For instance, Bolivia proposed a res-
olution on knowledge management tools for environmental sustainability 
and delegates invited the Executive Director to consider organizing a work-
shop on this issue at the second session of UNEA,47 including consultation 
processes for the GEO and UNEP Live. 
However, while universal membership—as embodied in the UNEA—
formalizes the process and reflects the evolving and (re) constitution of in-
stitutional framework for international environmental governance includ-
ing the integration of environmental concerns in non-environmental policy 
domains in the form of enhanced UNEP’s status, it is widely recognized 
that a higher status cannot be acquired solely through a name change. For 
this reason, governments should ensure UNEP emerges as a strong political 
and strategic vehicle for strengthening the environmental dimension of sus-
tainable development. UNEA should also explore a strong leadership focus 
on scientific knowledge about the planetary boundaries by strengthening 
scientific analysis, cooperation, dialogue and practical solutions to address 
the emerging ‘second generation’ environmental challenges.
Overall, the ministerial outcome document of the first UNEA session 
is fairly modest, surely if compared to the expectation leading up to the 
historic summit, and indeed the two major Rio summits, especially on iden-
tifying and reducing gaps in the science-policy interface necessary to achieve 
sustainable development and poverty eradication. However, this sharp focus 
on the science-policy interface and national as well as regional level capac-
ity building at the first session of UNEA, including critical environmental 
considerations not covered yet by system-wide environmental strategies, it 
seems represent a renewed practical focus on UNEP’s work at the nexus of 
science and policy.
4. POLITICAL ECONOMY PERSPECTIVE
Lemos and Agrawal argue that a more nuanced and persuasive account of the reconfiguration of institutional arrangements of environmental 
governance demands attention to organizational and discursive elements 
46 UNEP/EA.1/2/Add.4 and UNEP/EA.1/ INF/23.
47 See Bolivia’s resolution (UNEP/EA.1/CW/CRP.3) on different approaches, visions, models 
and tools for environmental sustainability. For more details, see also the final resolution, 
UNEP/EA.1/L.14.
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of power and their interrelationship, as “the supposed new mechanisms of 
governance are little more than a natural evolution of traditional regime 
politics because outsiders and disempowered groups continue to have little 
opportunity to participate in contemporary efforts at governance despite 
the greater incorporation of civil society actors.”48 Furthermore, the mul-
tiple actors comprising the system of environmental governance, and their 
actions need to be mutually reinforcing and better coordinated. As Newell 
notes, political economy of the dynamic relationship between states and 
markets, and the broader shifts in law, custom, and political interests in IEG 
has to be placed centrally to reflect on “the fact that global environmental 
governance cannot be understood separately from broader shifts in authori-
ty in global politics”.49 Political economy is a valuable approach for analyz-
ing and characterizing the interactions of markets and states in shaping en-
vironmental politics and policies at the nation-state and international scale. 
As a mode of inquiry, political economy critiques the dominant social and 
economic arrangements of modern life that have come to characterize the 
capitalist industrial society.50 Because of changes in the global system and 
the fragmented institutional arrangements of environmental governance de-
scribed previously, political economy has emerged as a viable approach to 
locate IEG within the major contours of governance designed to promote 
and sustain economic globalisation.51
From Stockholm to Rio and beyond, international environmental law 
has largely developed in a fragmented, piecemeal and sectoral manner 
through,52 specific treaties targeting certain issues for the protection and 
preservation of the environment.53 Because of this fragmentation, duplica-
tions and even contradictions in spending by different elements of the sys-
tem is a key concern. It is therefore, not surprising that UNEP’s work in 
international environmental law followed a similar pattern of governance, 
48 Maria Carmen Lemos and Arun Agrawal, 2006. “Environmental Governance” Annual 
Review of Environment and Resources, p. 312. Also See generally Ford, L.H., 2003. 
“Challenging Global Environmental Governance: Social Movement Agency and Global 
Civil Society.” Global Environmental Politics 3(2): p. 120-134.
49 Peter Newell, 2008. The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance, Review 
of International Studies [p. 513].
50 Richard B. Norgaard, 1994. Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolu-
tionary Revisioning of the Future, London and New York: Routledge. p.15-16.
51 Paterson, M., D. Humphreys and L. Pettiford, 2003. Conceptualizing Global Environmen-
tal Governance: From Interstate Regimes to Counter-Hegemonic Struggles, Global Envi-
ronmental Governance for the 21st Century, edited by D. Humphreys, M. Paterson and L. 
Pettiford, special issue, pp. 5.
52 Fariborz Zelli, 2011. “The Fragmentation of the Global Climate Governance Architec-
ture.” Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, 2(2): p. 255-270.
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by starting with regional sectoral treaties and then graduating into global 
sectoral issues. Multilaterally, lack of policy integration between regimes is 
a concern of IEG that the new UNEA should eschew at all costs. In more 
critical terms, Newell argues that incoherence in policy objectives in inter-
national environmental law is evident in economic orthodoxies that are sa-
crosanct and protected from scrutiny, and the narrowing of the terms of the 
negotiations to “political solutions that can comfortably be accommodated 
within the business-as-usual model” of modern neoliberalism has only pro-
moted marginalization and delegitimization of effective alternative forms 
of environmental governance.54 This may be the true litmus test of how a 
strengthened and upgraded UNEP, especially through universalization of 
the membership of its governing body, responds coherently and effectively 
to international environmental governance since Rio+20.
A. Embedding UNEA Within Global Development Agenda
At Rio+20, governments bestowed a level of legitimacy upon UNEA far beyond UNEP’s governing council oversight functions with the author-
ity to drive environmental reforms and address serious environmental chal-
lenges. For instance, many observers stress that UNEP (and UNEA) should 
actively engage in providing input to the post-2015 process, including for-
mulation of SDGs. One option that had been promoted before the UNEA 
conference was elevating the Environment Management Group established 
in 2001 to coordinate UN programs, organs, specialized agencies, and the 
secretariats of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, to the same status 
as other bodies reporting to the UN system’s Chief Executives Board (CEB) 
for Coordination.55,56 Other, more far reaching proposals, have recommend-
53 Ibid [p. 260]; Sebastian Oberthür1 and Olav Schram Stokke, 2011. “Institutional Com-
plexity and Interplay Management: Compatibility and Change in Global Governance” p. 
5; Eero Palmujoki, 2006. Liberal Norms and Global Environmental Governance. Torino, 
Section Seven: Global Governance, a Critical Encounter, p. 12; R. Daniel Kelemen1 and 
David Vogel, 2009. “Trading Places: The Role of the United States and the European Union 
in International Environmental Politics.” Comparative Political Studies. 43(4): 427-456. 
(2011): [p. 435]; Maria Ivanova, 2010. “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: De-
sign, Leadership, Location.” Global Environmental Politics [p. 43].
54 Peter Newell, 2008. The Political Economy of Global Environmental Governance, Review 
of International Studies, [p. 517].
55 United Nations Environment Management Group (EMG). Report of the Annual Meeting 
of the Environment Management Group. EMG/AM.07/11.
56 Maria Ivanova, 2009. Global Environmental Governance in the 21
st Century: Way Ahead 
Wide Open. Report from the Global Environmental Governance Forum: Reflecting on the 
Past, Moving into the Future, held in Glion, Switzerland, June 28–July 2, 2009. Available 
at <http://www.environmentalgovernance.org>, accessed on July 13, 2014.
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ed creating a new body to be named as ‘sustainable development council’ 
directly under the UN General Assembly, similar to the UN Human Rights 
Council, which was established as an independent body of the UN General 
Assembly.57 We still lack, therefore, a clear articulation of the application 
of a coherent political economy approach to embed global environmental 
governance to SDGs, particularly global economic processes. Additional-
ly, informal meetings of the first OECPR prior to the UNEA conference 
suggested UNEP should actively engage in providing input on targets and 
indicators for the post-2015 development agenda and the SDGs.58 Yet, both 
the enhanced remit for UNEP and the post-2015 process are products of the 
Rio+20 outcome born alongside one another. Therefore, how the expanded 
UNEP interfaces with the post-2015 development agenda process and the 
OWG on SDGs could provide the first litmus test in practice on the effec-
tiveness of UNEA in spearheading leadership on the environmental dimen-
sions of sustainable development.
It should be noted, however, as Najam et al., surmise that as interna-
tional environmental law evolves and matures, proliferation and fragmenta-
tion might begin to slow as “negotiation fatigue” sets in and member states 
become less interested in creating new MEAs.59 Furthermore, investment 
in improving the management of MEAs and depoliticization of IEG could 
result in certain characteristics that are particularly important for advancing 
the post-2015 development agenda, such as scaling down the number of 
MEAs but enhancing their scientific profile, rationalizing knowledge coop-
eration within the IEG system, guaranteeing independence and authorita-
tiveness of scientific assessments and research produced by various elements 
57 Frank Biermann, 2012. “Greening the United Nations Charter: World politics in the An-
thropocene.” Environment 54 (3) (2012): p. 6-17; For detailed evaluation on different 
proposals see Kanie N., Betsill, M.M., Zondervan R., Frank Biermann and Young, O.R. “A 
charter moment: Restructuring governance for sustainability.” Public Administration and 
Development 32, p. 292-304 (2012); High-level Panel on Global Sustainability. Resilient 
People, Resilient Planet: A Future Worth Choosing (2012). Available at <www.un.org/gsp>; 
State of the Planet Declaration. “Planet Under Pressure: New Knowledge Towards Solu-
tions.” By the Co-chairs of the Planet under Pressure conference (London, 26- 29 March 
2012) supported by the conference Scientific Organizing Committee, available at <www.
planetunderpressure2012.net>, accessed 07.10.14; for an extensive overview of the options, 
see Bernstein S. with Brunnée J. “Consultants’ Report on Options for Broader Reform of 
the Institutional Framework for Sustainable Development (IFSD): Structural, Legal, and 
Financial Aspects.” (New York: UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs), available 
at: <http://www.uncsd2012.org/index.php?page=view&type=400&nr=211&menu=45>, 
accessed July 20, 2014.
58 ENB, 2014. Report of the first meeting of the Open-ended Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives (OECPR) to UNEP.
59 Adil Najam, Mihaela Papa, Nadaa Taiyab, 2006. Global Environmental Governance: A 
Reform Agenda. International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), p. 33.
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of the IEG system, and more focus on integrating environment into national 
development agenda. Internationally, environmental law is increasingly re-
flecting an integrated approach by taking into account social and economic 
development goals.60 It is also recognizing national disparities in relative de-
velopment levels, while necessitating differentiated implementation sched-
ules, financial resources, and technology transfers as ways to assist devel-
oping countries meet their international obligations. Furthermore, IEG has 
increased the role for non-state actors and epistemic communities providing 
intergovernmental forums for different pieces of the international environ-
mental agenda, as well as recognizing the participation of private actors 
in promoting sustainable development, integrated economic growth, social 
development and environmental protection.61 The result is the embedding of 
new and innovative concepts, principles, rules, ideas, and decision-making 
procedures in areas such as implementation, compliance, dispute avoidance, 
and dispute settlement. In this regard, international environmental law is 
enhancing environmental integration, development and economic process 
by providing effective legal and regulatory framework for implementing en-
vironmental treaties.
Strengthening UNEP (and UNEA) implies a need for additional resourc-
es and expanded stakeholder participation in environmental governance, as 
well as inter alia: increased sensitivity towards social and economic safe-
guards; sharpened communications and knowledge management strategies 
to enhance the science-policy interface; improved quality of monitoring and 
reporting; increased investment in new systems and partnerships; and en-
hanced results-based management. However, a political economy account 
requires a grounding of this new status to demonstrate effective flow of 
knowledge, leadership, mainstreaming, and coherence between environ-
mental change and its governance, at national and international scale. 
Moreover, this enhanced remit has the promise of a broadening expertise, 
gaining support for implementation, and boosting legitimacy and owner-
ship of programmes. According to The Future We Want,62 governments es-
tablished a high-level political forum to provide a “dynamic platform for 
regular dialogue, and stocktaking and agenda setting to advance sustainable 
development”, along with a number of related tasks. The World Bank and 
60 Michael Ewing-Chow and Darryl Soh, 2009. Pain, Gain, or Shame: The Evolution of Envi-
ronmental Law and the Role of Multinational Corporations, 16 Indiana Journal of Global 
Legal Studies. p. 201-202.
61 Ulrich Beyerlin and Thilo Marauhn, 2011. “International Environmental Law.” Devon, p. 
255.
62 The Future We Want [para. 85].
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the World Trade Organization (WTO) as well as other multilateral financial 
and trade institutions were also invited to participate. However, no more 
concrete and specific reforms on high-level coordination could be agreed.
However, a core part of UNEP’s institutional legitimacy depends on 
its success in enhancing consensus-based stakeholder engagement, perspec-
tives, and participation on environmental governance. As proliferation of 
international environmental institutions within the UN system has advanced 
so has the mushrooming of non-UN international and regional institutions 
claiming sustainable development to be central to their overarching goals. 
UNEP has made substantial investments in improving participation of these 
major groups and stakeholders through expanded access-to-information 
policy, including the two-day ‘global major groups and stakeholders forum’ 
held prior to each meeting of the governing council, with the 15th forum 
held ahead of the first UNEA session. However, at the first OECPR held 
ahead of the UNEA session, when it came to considering the definition of 
stakeholder categories, the process for accrediting stakeholders, the roles of 
the UNEA and Committee of Permanent Representatives (CPR), consensus 
seemed elusive, partly due to the steep learning curve of the new UNEA 
rules and procedures. There is an important and conceptually significant 
correlation, therefore, between expanded access-to-information policy and 
enhanced role of stakeholders. For this reason procedural matters domi-
nated the first UNEA session. For instance, in the Committee of the Whole 
meetings, perception that the UNEA’s bureau had perhaps not fully set the 
rules of procedure was evident. 
B. Wither Environmentalism? Current Debates on Sustainability 
Governance
One major concern at the inaugural UNEA session was how to maintain UNEP’s place as the environmental voice of the UN system. Observers 
expressed skepticism about UNEA’s ability to influence the SDGs and post-
2015 process, and some delegates saw this as a key litmus test for UNEP 
in the post-2015 negotiations in ensuring sustainability is fully integrated 
across all the SDGs. Despite awareness that UNEA should not be seen to be 
“stepping on the institutional toes” of other institutions, hopes of this inte-
gration ahead of the second meeting of the HLPF and the final meeting of 
the OWG in New York later in the year, may now rest instead on ‘minilater-
alism,’ that is, negotiations among a few interested institutions and groups 
with a particular view to the effectiveness of policymaking, such as those 
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created at the Rio+20. Nevertheless, many delegations in Nairobi viewed 
UNEP’s successful organization of the first UNEA session as a vindication 
of the strength of the organization and its leadership in offering practical 
tools for integrating sustainability across the social and economic SDGs. 
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon described UNEP as “better placed than 
ever” to provide the science, governance and tools to help mainstream en-
vironment into policymaking processes.63 The sensitivities around the SDG 
discussions at the inaugural UNEA, where delegates were repeatedly re-
minded not to preempt the outcome of the post-2015 process, probably do 
not justify this enthusiasm.
In the current international system, however, political economy has 
deep aversion towards liberal institutional structures and arrangements 
of state and corporate power including global capitalist relations and eco-
nomic globalization.64 In this regard, a weakness of the political economy 
approach is its inability to identify the social causes of an environmental 
problem. It is this deficiency of the logic of the market that could give theo-
retical majority voting rights on a per capita basis to countries with higher 
populations such as China and India, in international negotiations at the 
expense of smaller countries. If UNEP’s leadership on core themes such as 
ecosystem management, environmental governance, climate change, chem-
icals and waste, and resource efficiency is relatively well acknowledged, the 
institutional implications of a strengthened and upgraded UNEP are just be-
ginning to sink in within the UN system. Furthermore, even though scientif-
ic inputs are highly regarded to UNEP (and UNEA’s) institutional legitimacy 
and environmental governance, their significance, operationalization, and 
utility is determined by the decisions and actions of member states. Here is 
where a reformed UNEP (and indeed United Nations) should redefine itself 
by embracing weighted voting system65 that grants voting rights to member 
states on account of the average of the population, contributions to the UN 
budget, and membership status.
Despite the well-showcased UNEP’s institutional mandate and con-
vening power, as demonstrated by the number of heads of MEAs and UN 
63 UNEP [p. 6].
64 Joseph M. Grieco, 1998. “Anarchy and the limits of cooperation: A realist critique of the 
newest liberal institutionalism.” International Organization 42: 485–507. p. 501–502.
65 Joseph E. Schwartzberg, 2009. “Universal weighted regional representation as a basis 
for security council reform,” presentation at the opening panel on Reform of the Securi-
ty Council at the International Law Weekend Conference of the American Branch of the 
International Law Association, New York, 22 October, 2009. Available at: <http://www.
josephschwartzberg.org/Regional_Representation.pdf>, accessed on October 10, 2014.
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specialized agencies who attended the first UNEA conference, observers 
contend that the answer to effective sustainability governance does not lie 
with the UN system, “even if reformed, but in stronger reliance on bot-
tom-up approaches driven by the private sector and civil society, includ-
ing through nongovernmental agreements, transnational movements, and 
non-binding multisectoral partnerships”.66 Arguing for such an approach 
should not amount to an endorsement of, explicit or implicit, exaggerated 
form of “pluralistic and post-ideological conception of the world,” or form 
of environmental politics.67 In addition, at the UNEA session some dele-
gates argued that the principal problem with fragmentation of IEG lies with 
the dominant modern economic trajectories and social institutional arran-
gements, and suggested the new SDGs should be well-balanced in terms of 
the environmental, economic and social goals. Cognizant of the dominate 
global economic system among other considerations, at the Rio+20, govern-
ments decided that the negotiated SDGs should be “action-oriented, concise 
and easy to communicate, limited in number, aspirational, global in nature 
and universally applicable to all countries while taking into account differ-
ent national realities, capacities and levels of development and respecting 
national policies and priorities.”68 However, with UNEA unable to adopt a 
decision especially on the stakeholder policy and related rules of procedure, 
more engagement and debate in this area is needed during the intersessional 
period to get this process back on track.
C. Looking to Post-2015 Development World Under UNEA
Finally, the question arises whether UNEA is “fit for purpose” as the UN General Assembly’s subsidiary organ charged with safeguarding global 
sustainability governance and dealing “with new and emerging pressures” 
in the wake of the universalization of the membership of UNEP’s governing 
body, as called for in paragraph 88 of The Future We Want. Some observ-
ers have argued that UNEA should seize the moment and send a strong 
message to the General Assembly on UNEP’s role in the post-2015 devel-
opment agenda.69 The UNEA ministerial outcome document reaffirmed 
government’s commitment to full implementation of the Rio+20 outcome 
66 Frank Biermann, 2012. Greening the United Nations Charter: World politics in the Anthro-
pocene. Environment, p.6.
67 Rosaleen Duffy, 2005. “The Politics of Global Environmental Governance: The Powers and 
Limitations of Transfrontier Conservation Areas in Central Americas”, Review of Interna-
tional Studies, 31, p. 309.
68 The Future We Want [para. 246].
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document, and all the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development.
Yet, the question remains whether strengthening of UNEP should also 
entail organizational reconfiguration under UNEO or World Environment 
Organization to improve system-wide coherence and coordination deficit 
in the global governance architecture that has resulted in considerable frag-
mentation, substantial costs and suboptimal policy outcomes. Related to 
the three issues is the need for restructuring of EMG to enhance coherence 
and system-wide coordination needs of different agencies and secretariats 
of MEAs. Still, others question whether such restructuring should include 
additional financial resources, consolidation of UNEP headquarters func-
tions in Nairobi, putting GEF directly under UNEP, strengthening of human 
resources through transparent hiring processes, higher levels of accountabil-
ity and performance review, improvement in access and participation pro-
cedures, review of all the rules of procedures for decision making, agenda 
structuring, expanded role of UNEP secretariat to oversee science-policy 
interface under the Office of the Chief Scientist including quality of project 
proposals for the Environment Fund, or heightened mechanisms for verifi-
cation and compliance of environmental regimes. As pointed out in the UN 
Joint Inspection Unit report in 2008 and reaffirmed again in the 2014 re-
port, “the current framework of international environmental governance is 
weakened by institutional fragmentation and specialization and the lack of 
a holistic approach to environmental issues and sustainable development” 
stemming from a “blurred distinction in [the UN system organizations’] 
work programmes between environmental protection and sustainable de-
velopment and the absence of a single strategic planning framework”70…
[for] developing “common approaches to identify regional strategies aimed 
at strengthening sustainable development and participating in the process 
towards post-2015 MDGs.”71
However, since 2013, intensive groundwork for formalizing the post-
2015 development agenda began with the UN General Assembly’s Special 
Event held in September 2013 to, inter alia: approve a road map for the 
intergovernmental process; establish the HLPF; launch the Open Working 
69 UNEP [45].
70 See Tadanori Inomata, 2008. Management Review of Environmental Governance within 
the United Nations System (prepared by Tadanori Inomata). JIU/REP/2008/3, UN Joint In-
spection Unit report (2008): pp. iii; and Tadanori Inomata and Jean Wesley Cazeau, 2008. 
UN Joint Inspection Unit. Post-Rio+20 Review of Environmental Governance within the 
United Nations System, p. 8.
71 The Future We Want, 2012 [operative para. 185].
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Group on Sustainable Development Goals; and launch the Intergovern-
mental Committee of Experts on Sustainable Development Financing (IC-
ESDF).72 All the four tracks are at different stages of consensus building and 
negotiations, are expected to be complete by 2015. Throughout the post-
2015 development agenda debates, UNEP has actively worked to enhance 
coherence and complementarities between environmental and environ-
ment-related institutional arrangements. Further, it has increasingly reartic-
ulated its role by collaborating and identifying synergies among the conven-
tions, utilizing the capabilities of the entire programme to contribute to the 
objectives agreed under the various action plans, and global and regional 
conventions. Subsequently, UNEP has undertaken a series of initiatives to 
develop coherent interlinkages among the conventions and MEAs, and de-
spite its narrow ‘normative and catalytic’ mandate, promoted their effective 
implementation.73 Furthermore, it has consistently presented a panoply of 
reports to enhance complementarities between international instruments re-
lated to environment and sustainable development, specifically through the 
green economy initiative, climate change, chemicals and waste, resource ef-
ficiency, ecosystems management and environmental governance. It remains 
to be seen, however, how it reconstitutes its normative and catalytic role in 
international environmental governance under a strengthened UNEA in the 
post-2015 development world.
5. CONCLUSION
At the UNEA conference, world’s governments adopted decisions to strengthen UNEP’s role in promoting air quality. They also resolved 
to enhance mainstreaming of chemicals and waste management in national 
development plans, implement Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on En-
vironment and Development, as well as enhance science-policy interface. 
Yet more remains to be done. As noted in the 2014 Pathways to Deep 
Decarbonization, “economic, social, and environmental risks of unabated 
climate change are immense…and threaten to roll back the fruits of de-
cades of growth and development, undermine prosperity, and jeopardize 
72 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Special Event on the MDGs was called for by 
the UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD, or Rio+20) and held in New 
York on 25 September 2013. See <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/pdf/Outcome%20
documentMDG.pdf>).
73 Maria Ivanova, 2010. “UNEP in Global Environmental Governance: Design, Leadership, 
Location.” Global Environmental Politics, p. 33.
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countries’ ability to achieve even the most basic socio-economic develop-
ment goals in the future.”74
The current science-policy interface is a major leadership experiment 
in environmental governance. As with enhancing institutional arrange-
ments of global environmental governance, inspiring and strengthening a 
knowledge-based and a knowledge-producing IEG system at all scales, as 
resolved at the UNEA meeting, is imperative to sustainable development in 
a post-2015 development world. Such a system should seek to deepen insti-
tutionalized framework in IEG where sound scientific knowledge informs 
environmental policy in a meaningful way. It should also provide for inclu-
sion of legitimate environmental interests of key stakeholders and relevant 
non-state actors. Internationally, a strengthened UNEP (and UNEA) is syn-
onymous with effective environmental governance and system-wide scien-
tific and knowledge coherence. UNEA therefore must emulate independent, 
authoritative, and cutting-edge policy objective that other multilateral and 
international organizations such as the World Bank, UNDP, World Health 
Organization and World Trade Organization, have become known for. In 
light of the foregoing, there is need to further strengthen UNEA to serve as 
‘the authoritative advocate for the global environment’ not just ‘within the 
United Nations system’ but globally, as part of a new IEG structure, intend-
ed to position environment within sustainable development space alongside 
peace and security, global health, trade and sustainable economic growth. 
It is also vital that UNEA should be given a chance to co-evolve to keep up 
with environmental challenges as they themselves change and to distinguish 
itself by eschewing broad statements on multitude of issues. For this to be 
realized, UNEP (and UNEA) should have secure, stable and adequate finan-
cial resources, as called for in paragraph 88 of The Future We Want, not just 
from “the regular budget of the UN and voluntary contributions to fulfill 
its mandate,” but from all major financing sources targeting environmental 
issues in order to fulfill its objectives under the enhanced mandate.
In short, it is time to act. A serious mismatch persists between IEG and 
coordination of secretariats of the MEAs, and it is vital for UNEA to develop 
structures to effectively support the link between sustainable development 
74 Pathways to Deep Decarbonization report (emphasis added). Published by the Sustainable 
Development Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Institute for Sustainable Development 
and International Relations (IDDRI), New York (2014): xi. The Deep Decarbonization 
Pathways Project (DDPP) is a collaborative initiative co-founded by the Sustainable Devel-
opment Solutions Network (SDSN) and the Institute for Sustainable Development and In-
ternational Relations (IDDRI) to understand and show steps needed by individual countries 
to transition to a low-carbon economy.
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and sustainability governance. This support should be backed up by collec-
tive action on additional financial resources and concrete proposals emanat-
ing from the strengthened UNEA in order to inspire effective science-policy 
assessment and knowledge-producing IEG. For this reason, governments 
must take additional action to improve coherent policy decision-making 
and norm-setting to improve international environmental governance in the 
post-2015 era. Neither the existing disharmony in environmental policies 
and management systems in leadership and system-wide coherence nor the 
considerable fragmentation and suboptimal policy outcomes are tenable in 
enhancing intergovernmental processes for the post-2015 era. Strengthen-
ing leadership and management capacity in IEG and enhancing innovative 
financing mechanisms under UNEA, as well as improving collaboration 
and networking amongst various stakeholders is needed to achieve the 
global development goals. This calls for further reforms and strengthening 
of UNEA as well as improving international cooperation in environmen-
tal governance, especially institutions, rules and arrangements in order to 
achieve and sustain development gains in 2015.
